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Abstract
Higher uncertainty about the effects of policy instruments reduces a policymaker’s inclina-
tion to actively engage in shaping economic policy. If a credibility problem exists, then this is
beneﬁcial. However, in the case where the policymaker has private information about an
economic shock, higher uncertainty is costly. Hence, the policymaker faces a trade-off when
he decides on the degree of control of monetary instruments. It is shown that the optimal
degree of uncertainty about the effects of policy depends on the economic preferences of the
policymaker and the magnitude of the variance of the shock which is private information.
I. Introduction
An important issue in the conduct of monetary policy revolves around the
selection of the monetary operating procedure. In this realm, Swank
(1994) has recently analysed the consequences of imperfect control of
monetary instruments in the context of a monetary policy game due to
Barro and Gordon (1983). In his model, imperfect control stems from the
uncertain effects of policy instruments. Brainard (1967) has shown that
when the effects of an instrument are surrounded by uncertainty (called
multiplicative uncertainty), the policymaker should use the instrument
conservatively. Likewise, Swank ﬁnds that worse control of the instruments
reduces the policymaker’s incentive to use the instruments actively and
therefore reduces the inﬂationary bias associated with the conduct of
monetary policy. This result implies that from a normative perspective, the
policymaker should adopt the most inefﬁcient operating procedure.
Swank’s result hinges crucially on the implicit assumption that monetary
policy only produces an undesirable inﬂationary bias. Then any measure
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Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.that induces the policymaker to abstain from the active use of the policy
instrument is beneﬁcial. Indeed, a drawback of Swank’s model is that it
does not allow a policymaker to play a beneﬁcial role. For instance, it does
not take into account that monetary instruments can be used to stabilise
the economy in response to unforeseen shocks. In this paper we extend
Swank’s framework to deal with this problem, by assuming that the policy-
maker has private information about a shock in the economy; cf. Canzo-
neri (1985). This extension of the model changes Swank’s results
concerning the optimal monetary policy procedure. In our model the
policymaker faces a trade-off when he decides on the degree of control.
We show that higher uncertainty about the effects of policy, apart from
reducing the inﬂationary bias of policy, increases the distortion of stabilisa-
tion policy. Hence, in our model, monetary control procedures with little
uncertainty are optimal if the inﬂationary bias of policy turns out to be a
minor problem (when the policymaker attributes a low priority to pursuing
real objectives) and if the stabilisation problem is relatively important
(when the shock in the economy about which the policymaker has private
information has a high variance). In contrast to Swank, we ﬁnd that reduc-
ing multiplicative uncertainty and therefore gaining information about
how the economy works may improve welfare.
Section II is devoted to presenting the model and deriving policy
decisions. The optimal control of the operating procedure is derived in
Section III.
II. The Model
We begin by presenting a model of monetary policy as developed by Barro
and Gordon (1983), which is extended to analyse the consequences of
multiplicative uncertainty; cf. Swank (1994). The variables yt and pt denote
the log of output and inﬂation. Consider a policymaker who cares about





where ka1, sa0 and y*a0. The parameter y* is the log of the equilibrium
rate of output corresponding to the natural rate of employment. The cost
that a policymaker attaches to inﬂating relative to deviations of output





where ya0. The superscript e denotes expectations, which are formed by
wage setters prior to the realisation of pt. Equation (2) is commonly used
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464 W. Letteriein models of monetary policy that address credibility issues; for a rationale
see Cukierman (1992, Ch. 3).
Following Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Swank (1994) we assume







t is the policy variable. Let E(·) be the expectations operator.




e and cov(tt, et)=0. The
variance of tt indicates that the effects of the policy variable p
p
t are uncer-
tain. We assume that wage setters do not observe tt and et when they set
their nominal wages and determine p
e
t. However, the policymaker has
private information about et when he chooses policy. This information
advantage enables the policymaker to play a stabilisation role by accom-
modating a perceived shock et in order to stabilise the price level and
output.
Like Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Swank (1994) we assume that
s
2
t is an institutional feature of the operating procedure chosen by the
policymaker. Institutional aspects are less ﬂexible than policy choices.
Therefore, we assume that the policymaker chooses s
2
t before the actual
policy process takes place and remains ﬁxed during the whole policy
game.
Summarising, our policy game consists of ﬁve stages. In stage 1 the
policymaker determines s
2
t. In stage 2 the private sector forms p
e
t. In stage
3 the policymaker observes et. In stage 4 the policymaker selects p
p
t. Finally,
in stage 5 tt is realised. We solve the game by using backwards
induction.
Optimal Policy Decision










When the policymaker determines p
p
t, he knows the forecast et. However,
he has no information about the variable tt. Hence, he selects p
p
t by
minimising Epm(L), where Epm(L) indicates that expectations of L are















We denote the inﬂation rate that the private sector expects by p
e
t. The
private sector knows that inﬂation is determined by equation (3), but does


























As is usual in models of monetary policy, the optimal discretionary choice
of p
p
t contains an inﬂationary bias, K. Equation (6) shows that K decreases
if s
2
t increases, leading to lower inﬂation. However, the second term on the
r.h.s. of (7) indicates that a rise in s
2
t also distorts stabilisation policy, since
then the response to et decreases (in absolute value). These results reﬂect
that an instrument should be used conservatively if its consequences are
















Equations (8) and (9) reveal that inﬂation and output are partly
stabilised by the policymaker, since only a part of the variance of et (i.e. s
2
e)
appears. For both variances, we ﬁnd that the lower s
2
t, the better the
stabilisation.
III. Optimal Instrument Control
We now derive the optimal degree of instrument control; cf. Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986) and Swank (1994). We derive the unconditional
expected value of the policymaker’s loss function: L*. This function takes
into account the policy formation process as discussed in Section II and is


























where K is given by equation (6). In the Appendix we show
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where c=[y(kµ1)y*]/sea0. We distinguish three cases: (I) cas+y
2; (II)
sscss+y
2; and (III) css. Comparing case (I) with case (III) and using
the deﬁnition of c shows that case (I) represents a situation where s
2
e and
s are relatively low and where (kµ1)y* is relatively high. Hence, in case (I)
the credibility problem is comparatively important since K is high, whereas
interests to stabilise in response to the shock et are relatively small, because
s
2
e is low. Case (III) describes the opposite situation. Case (II) is
intermediate. The following proposition shows the consequences of




(AI) If case (I) applies, qL*/qs
2
t is always negative.
(AII) If case (II) applies, qL*/qs
2
t is negative for 0Rs
2









(AIII) If case (III) applies, qL*/qs
2
t is always positive.
In stage 1 of the policy game we described in Section II, the policymaker
selects the control of the operating procedure, s
2
t. Obviously, in case (III)
the policymaker adopts an operating procedure which is precise (s
2
t =0).
The beneﬁts from dealing with the credibility problem are lower than the
beneﬁts of better stabilisation of the economy. The opposite applies to case
(I). In the intermediate case (II) the policymaker prefers to choose s
2
t =x.
The discussion is summarised in proposition B where s
2
t* denotes the




(BI) If case (I) applies, then s
2
t*=l
(BII) If case (II) applies, then s
2
t*=x
(BIII) If case (III) applies, then s
2
t*=0.
Proposition B indicates that adopting a control mechanism for inﬂation
which is not too precise is optimal when case (I) or (II) applies. In our
model, imperfect monetary control may be desirable because
multiplicative uncertainty reduces the inclination to actively use the
monetary instrument; cf. Swank (1994). Therefore, as in Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986), our model shows that ambiguous control procedures may
be desirable. However, the incentive to adopt imperfect monetary control
stems from a different source. In Cukierman and Meltzer’s model, private
467 Monetary control and the distortion of stabilisation policyinformation is the main reason why a policymaker would like to adopt
ambiguous control procedures, since this improves the policymaker’s
ability to preserve an information advantage concerning his goals.
However, in our model, private information reduces the policymaker’s
inclination to adopt procedures which are imprecise. Hence, the role of
private information differs. Our results are more intuitive than those of
Swank. In our model the optimal s
2
t may be ﬁnite and as low as
technologically feasible, whereas in Swank’s model s
2
t* is inﬁnite.
The desired degree of multiplicative uncertainty depends on whether
case (I), (II) or (III) prevails according to proposition B. This implies that
s
2
t* is related to the degree of inﬂation aversion (s), the variance of et(s
2
e)
and the output gap: (kµ1)y*. In the Appendix we show that the desired
degree of multiplicative model uncertainty is related to the parameters of
the model as follows. First, the higher the variance of the shock et, the
lower the preferred uncertainty concerning the effects of policy
instruments. Second, the desired degree of multiplicative uncertainty tends
to be lower if the policymaker becomes less interested in pursuing real
objectives (higher s or lower (kµ1)y*). Summarising:
Proposition C. The optimal value for s
2
t tends to decrease as s
2
e increases, s
increases and (kµ1)y* decreases.
Appendix
Derivation of Equations (8) and (9)
Inﬂation is determined by (3). The unconditional expected value of inﬂation can
be derived using the equilibrium rate of inﬂation (equation (7)) and the stochas-
tic properties of et and tt. This yields E(pt)=K. Hence, the unconditional vari-
ance of pt equals var(pt)=E(ptµK)












































Derivation of Equation (11)
Differentiating (10) with respect to s
2
t yields
























































































































Hence, the sign of the ﬁrst-order derivative is given by the ﬁrst term in brackets


















Proof of Proposition C
Suppose that case III applies. Then s
2
t*=0. If s and s
2
e decrease and (kµ1)y*
increases then, at a certain point, case II starts to apply and x is the optimal value
of s
2



















Since  qc/qses0 and qc/q((kµ1)y*)a0, we obtain that qx/qses0 and
qx/q((kµ1)y*)a0. Hence, when s and  s
2
e continue decreasing and (kµ1)y*
469 Monetary control and the distortion of stabilisation policycontinues increasing, x rises and therefore s
2
t* increases. At some point case II
ceases to hold and then case I applies, where s
2
t*=l. Because xsl, we
conclude that proposition C summarises this discussion.
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